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The 2004 European Parliament election was perceived by the Guardian newspaper as “Britain’s most virulent anti-European result.”​[2]​  Due to the continually escalating levels of Euroscepticism​[3]​ on the “sceptr’d isle”​[4]​ it follows that the openly anti-EU United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) would achieve its greatest electoral victory by playing to an increasingly hostile public.  But how exactly did the English masses become so explicitly antagonistic towards the European Union?  There has been a constant and consistent feud with Europe ever since King Henry VIII broke his English kingdom away from the Catholic Church so that he could obtain a divorce from his wife Queen Catherine of Aragon in a bid to produce a male heir to the throne.​[5]​  The resulting schism with Catholicism fostered a need for the creation of an English national identity that set the country apart from the Continent.  The sceptical glance that was shot across the English Channel in the sixteenth century was purely out of fear of an attack by the Continental nation-states.  Following the creation of the European Union, Euroscepticism​[6]​ has grown stronger in Great Britain.  This paper starts by outlining the history behind European unification.  After explaining the creation of the present-day construct known as the European Union, I will lay out the theoretical approaches to be utilized in understanding this phenomenon.  A history of elite-led Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom will follow.  Moreover, a special focus will be placed on the use of immigration by political elites to increase support among the masses for a form of anti-EU sentiment known as xenophobic Euroscepticism.  This form of Euroscepticism will be shown to differ from, yet complement, the hard and soft versions explicated by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak.
The hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that political elites are using Euroscepticism as a tool to further their electoral ambitions without regard for the consequences associated with their actions.  According to Erik Bleich, actors recognize the importance of certain ideas and use these strategically to advance their interests.​[7]​  Additionally, certain members of the print media have caught on to the act and are using fantastic stories about the dangers of Brussels-based government in an effort to increase circulation.  I will also delve into and deconstruct the alternative hypothesis that Euroscepticism is not the work of elites but, instead, a bottom-up movement of the masses.  Evidence of mass Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom is borrowed from the EU Commission-sponsored Eurobarometer surveys.  
The success of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the June 2004 European Parliament elections changed the perception about the chances for electoral triumph of a solely anti-EU periphery party.  This paper will analyze UKIP and their recent rise to prominence.  The existence of elite Euroscepticism within the mainstream parties of the United Kingdom is unveiled in an ESRC-sponsored survey of British Parliamentarian attitudes towards Europe.  Finally, my survey of Parliamentarians uncovers a link between political elite and media framing of Euroscepticism and the resultant swing by the masses towards this phenomenon.  In the end, it will be shown that Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom is an elite-led movement that seems to be strengthening in the wake of a rapidly deepening European Union.
Prior to delving into the British case study it is important to note that this paper is not an attempt to determine party positions towards European integration.  There is a vast body of literature already available on the topic of determining whether a political party is Eurosceptic or not.​[8]​  Although I will historically outline the transformation of the Labour and Conservative Parties into the versions evident today, I am not prepared to investigate the theories and models used to determine whether a party favors or opposes further EU integration.  There will be, however, emphasis placed on numerous issues that continue to reinforce Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom.  With certain exceptions, this paper starts from the assumption that, as they stand today, the Conservative Party, UKIP, the Green Party, the British National Party (BNP) and the newly-formed Veritas are Eurosceptic, although the degrees of Euroscepticism differ and will be explicated below, and the Labour Party, Liberal Democrats and the nationalist parties of Scotland (SNP) and Wales (Plaid Cymru) are in favor of further EU integration.  Through historical analysis it will be shown that Europe has been an incredibly divisive issue for intra-party relations.  The previous studies on Euroscepticism tend to agree that political unity in favor of EU integration is the safest course for the leader of a mainstream party to take.  If there is substantial dissention from this position a party may face internecine with both Eurosceptics and Euroenthusiasts losing out.  Overall, while it is important to understand the theoretical justifications behind a party’s stance towards integration, this involved discussion deserves to be the central focus of another paper.
History of European Integration
	To start, it is necessary to briefly outline the genesis of the supranational body known today as the European Union.  After all, this body is responsible for the formation of Euroscepticism throughout Europe.  During the 1920s, following the devastation of World War I, economic researchers at the International Labour Organisation (ILO), established in Geneva by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 as an integral component of the League of Nations, followed the lead of economist John Maynard Keynes at Cambridge.  Keynes argued that governments throughout Europe could play an integral role in increasing and maintaining employment levels throughout their respective economies.  Additionally, he posited that “international coordination of monetary and public works policies would yield a new social order in which economic stability would play a major role in the maintenance of world peace.”​[9]​  This would prove to be the model of European stability that would enamor the minds of European leaders such as Jean Monnet, Roy Jenkins, Altiero Spinelli, and Jacques Delors following the end of hostilities in World War II.  Only this time they would be able to implement it.  
In May of 1950 the French foreign minister Robert Schuman launched the Schuman Plan, the design of the European federalist Jean Monnet.  The Schuman Plan led to the signing of the Treaty of Paris on April 15, 1951, which officially formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  The ECSC was entered into by France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg) as a way to ensure peace and prosperity following the two most disastrous wars in the history of mankind.  The United Kingdom, considering its position exceptional, refrained from joining the ECSC.​[10]​  With the signing of the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were officially established as further areas of cooperation among the members of the ECSC.  In 1967, all three of these institutions officially merged in an integrationist bid by Jean Monnet to begin the creation of “an ever closer union.”
	Throughout the 1970s the three European Communities were beset by high inflation, unbridled unemployment and low economic growth.  These economic crises, which also signaled the end of the “Golden Age” of the development of Western Europe’s social welfare states,​[11]​ made further integration impossible.  As the retrenchment of the European social welfare state began in earnest in the 1980s moves toward greater integration became possible.​[12]​  In the context of the stabilization of the European economic crises, a new Commission President named Jacques Delors took office in 1985 promoting the renaissance of the European Community.​[13]​  His first delivery on this promise was the passing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986.  The most notable achievement of the SEA was to lay down a timetable for the completion of the internal market of the EEC.  By eliminating internal frontiers, as stipulated by Article 13 of the Act, the Commission assumed that this piece of legislation would pave the way for further integration of member states and increasing supranational authority implemented by Brussels in the social, economic and political fields.​[14]​  Delors’ Commission would be proven right.
	By far, the most controversial of all the treaties was agreed at the Dutch city of Maastricht on December 11, 1991 and signed by the member states on February 7, 1992.  In fact, as outlined below, Maastricht has proven to be a catalyst of increasing Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom.  To start, the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as Maastricht was officially dubbed, established the formal European Union.  This revisionist treaty created a three pillar system of EU governance.  The first pillar included the EEC, ECSC, and EURATOM, as combined originally in 1967.  Now, however, this pillar would officially be referred to as the European Community (EC).  The EC serves as the motor of integration for the EU.  The other two pillars, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) are intergovernmental in nature and decisions are based on unanimity, meaning that every member state retains a veto over proposed legislation.  Moreover, the TEU endorsed moves to implement the now extant single currency.​[15]​  Overall, it is easy to understand why Eurosceptics in Great Britain, such as Sir James Goldsmith’s Referendum Party, viewed the TEU as the crucial step in the creation of a federal Europe.
	There have been three treaties since the TEU was signed in 1992 and I will briefly touch upon them here.  The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 brought little to the table of further integration.  Its two main accomplishments were the granting of more legislative powers to the European Parliament, the only directly-elected institution of the European Union, and the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement into the TEU.​[16]​  The Schengen Agreement allows for the free movement of people between and among member states of the European Union that have signed on.  A conspicuously absent signatory to Schengen is the United Kingdom.  The Treaty of Nice, agreed in December of 2000, sought to take the debate about the future of the European Union as close to the masses as possible.​[17]​  This newly established openness and inclusion of the European Union led to the Laeken Summit in December of 2001, which convened the “Convention on the Future of Europe” to draft a Constitution for the European Union.  From the beginning the 105 member Convention was designed to open the process up to scrutiny.  After all, the members included “two MPs from each national parliament, a government representative from each country, sixteen members of the European Parliament and two Commission representatives.”​[18]​  Whether this occurred is open to debate depending on the level of scepticism of the particular member.  However, the Convention did produce a unified draft European Constitution on July 18, 2003, which then went to an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) composed of the leaders of the member states for negotiation before signing.​[19]​  Therefore, the most recent, groundbreaking agreement of the European Union was the signing of the Constitutional Treaty for the EU in Rome on October 29, 2004.​[20]​  Accordingly, some states have chosen to ratify the treaty in their national parliaments while others have decided to hold referendums, bringing the future of the EU to the level of the individual citizen.  Great Britain has chosen the latter of the two options, which may prove dangerous given the high levels of hostility apparent in the country.
Theories and Alternative Hypothesis
	There are two theoretical approaches to the study of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom that demand attention.  The first is the intersubjective culturalist approach posited by Mark Lichbach.  This approach argues that individuals are dependent upon society and culture to form their identities.​[21]​  In Britain, the educational establishment does not place a great deal of emphasis on the teaching of contemporary history (post-1945) for primary and secondary school students.  This makes the subject of European integration unknown to pupils in the British school system.  Instead, history teaching in Britain focuses heavily upon the great events, personalities, wars, and conquests of the sceptr’d isle.  History teaching in Britain, especially England, is meant as a boost to the collective ego and this is why the focus is on such great topics as the English Civil War, the struggle against Catholic absolutism, and the beautiful words of Shakespeare and Milton.​[22]​  As a result, Europe is conveniently excluded and, as a result:
The collective identification with national symbols, history and institutions is far greater in the British political discourse than a potential identification with European symbols, history and institutions… ‘Europe’ simply does not resonate well with identity constructions deeply embedded in national political institutions and in political culture.​[23]​

Moreover, the history that students are exposed to generates a feeling of scepticism towards Europe as the “Other” that they have fought long and hard to protect themselves against.​[24]​  This construction of a unique British identity is critical to an understanding of the environment necessary for the popularity of Euroscepticism.  Culture, as conditioned and defined by education, plays a central role in the formation of anti-EU sentiment.
	The second theoretical approach that is critical to an understanding of elite-imposed Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom is rational choice.  In the wake of the European Parliament electoral success of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) there is a renewed vigor among Eurosceptic parties.  In addition to UKIP, Euroscepticism is the key issue underscored by the Veritas Party, formed under the leadership of Robert Kilroy-Silk MEP, and the British National Party (BNP).  According to rational choice theory, actors in the system behave rationally in order to optimize their returns or ends.​[25]​  It is understandable and rational for fringe parties to feel enthusiastic about the electoral success associated with a Eurosceptic party platform.  Mr. Kilroy-Silk is nothing if not a political opportunist and his failed bid to take control of UKIP underscores his move to found a new party based on Euroscepticism where he will try to enjoy, and further cultivate, the spoils of anti-EU sentiment.  The rational choice approach, though, does not only apply to actors inhabiting fringe parties.  What will a Labour MP, who has been for European integration in the past, do when confronted with the possibility of losing an election over the issue of Europe?  Will the MP act rationally and play to the Eurosceptic sentiment in the constituency?  Or will the MP stay true and risk the humiliating prospect of losing a seat at Westminster to a member of a fringe party?  These questions on the importance of electoral success highlight the significance of the rational choice approach when analyzing the Euroscepticism of political elites in Britain.
	Are political elites and the media truly framing the EU in such a way as to increase Euroscepticism?  Or, is it that they are merely responding to the desires of a mass-based Euroscepticism?  The model I am proposing is a top-down interpretation of Euroscepticism.  With this alternative bottom-up hypothesis the political elites and members of the media are simply giving the Eurosceptic masses what they want:  rhetoric aimed at either diminishing (soft Euroscepticism) or eliminating (hard Euroscepticism)​[26]​ the influence of the EU on the daily lives of Britons.  Julie Smith argues that the main reason why citizens of the member states do not vote in greater numbers in the European Parliament elections is because they see politicians as out of touch with constituents.​[27]​  Does this mean that the masses would come out in force if the mainstream politicians gave them the high levels of anti-EU rhetoric that they so greatly desire?  The latest Eurobarometer statistics for the United Kingdom exemplify high levels of anti-Europe sentiment among the population.  For instance, when the random sample was asked if they had a positive or a negative view of the European Union twenty-six percent answered positive while thirty-seven percent felt negatively.​[28]​  On another question, sixty-one percent of respondents were frightened that they would lose their national identity and culture in an expanding Europe.  Regarding immigration, fifty-four percent of respondents believed that the EU plays a negative role.​[29]​  Overall, there is compelling evidence that the masses in Britain are heavily Eurosceptic.  However, there is no solid information corroborating this hypothesis that the perceptions of elites toward Europe are being shaped by the pressure and opinions of the masses.  On the surface, it appears that these statistics merely reiterate the claim made throughout this paper that Eurosceptic political elites and the media are framing issues in an effective manner, which, in turn, is increasing anti-integration sentiment.  After all, with the lack of knowledge displayed by British citizens towards the EU​[30]​ it becomes almost impossible to believe that they are doing anything more than regurgitating the information provided to them by the press and political elites.               
Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom
	“Britain is the home of the term Euroscepticism.”​[31]​  Menno Spiering argues that the term was coined in the United Kingdom in the mid-1980s despite the fact that feelings of uneasiness towards European integration have been in place ever since the idea was turned into a reality beginning with the establishment of the ECSC in 1951.  Hugo Young argued that the former Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell was, in all actuality “the first Eurosceptic.”​[32]​  Therefore, for Spiering it is not anachronistic to speak of the people in Great Britain harboring Eurosceptic feelings prior to the actual invention of the term.
	But why was the Labour Party originally so Eurosceptic?  The answer is really quite simple.  Following World War II, the new Labour Government under Clement Attlee pushed through social reforms that included the establishment of the National Health Service.  Labour leaders, including Gaitskell and Callaghan, believed that their hard-won social gains would be undermined by membership in the European Community.​[33]​  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Labour, with individual exceptions, argued that the European Community would bring changes to the market economies of member states by imposing neo-liberalist ideals.  According to Huber and Stephens the quickened pace of European integration brought changes to the production regimes of Coordinated Market Economies of Continental Europe and led to central bank independence.​[34]​  For Wilensky, only the increased autonomy of central banks is seen as a serious threat to social policies implemented in the welfare state.​[35]​  Although the United Kingdom is categorized as a Liberal Market Economy by Hall and Soskice​[36]​ the danger posed by autonomous central banks, including the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, is a real concern for the champions of social welfare.  Therefore, the early Euroscepticism of the Labour Party is easy to understand given the possible threats posed to the social welfare state by European integration.  
	There is a dominant school of thought running rampant among Eurosceptics in Britain that Europe’s economic position has changed.  After starting as a liberal and forward-looking economic consortium in the 1950s, Eurosceptics claim that the EU today is marked by high regulation and taxation, inflexible labor markets, and restrictive policies on trade and investment.​[37]​  It is no surprise then that following the 1983 General Election disaster for Labour the party quickly decided against taking an anti-Europe stance.  After all, the impression of the EU as a “capitalist club” was quickly diminishing.​[38]​  This is outlined by the fact that almost all of the countries in the European Union, with the exception of Ireland, are Coordinated Market Economies.  CMEs that are based on strong social welfare policies would never allow Brussels to undermine these achievements.  Instead, the anti-EU sentiment was falling to the economic liberalists in Britain.  Most just happen to be sitting on the Conservative benches.
	Anyone familiar with Euroscepticism in Britain understands the importance of the Bruges speech given by then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on September 20, 1988.  In the speech Thatcher advocated that the European Community should be no more than an association of states working to strengthen its sovereign members.  Additionally, she argued that a successful EC could only be built on the “willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states,”​[39]​ and not by the unelected Commission aiming for a United States of Europe under the guidance of its federalist President Jacques Delors.  Thatcher, a clear supporter of economic integration and the free market, did not believe that further political and social deepening was necessary or desirable.​[40]​  According to Anthony Forster, this speech lent credibility to an intellectual form of Euroscepticism (shortly after the speech, the anti-integration Bruges Group was founded as a think tank committed to opposing the creation of a political union).​[41]​  Moreover, as Mrs. Thatcher increasingly fell out of grace with her own party she began to turn up the rhetoric against European integration in her progressively more populist speeches.  This tactic had a two-pronged effect:  Mrs. Thatcher hastened her political demise while polarizing the Conservative Party between anti- and pro-European factions for the first time.  The consequences of a starkly divided Conservative Party were about to be felt.
	Mrs. Thatcher’s forced resignation as Prime Minister in November 1990 was a somber occasion for Conservative Eurosceptics.  They had lost their newly-emerging leader and were soon to face the most compelling piece of integrationist legislation yet:  the Treaty on European Union.  The Maastricht Treaty was viewed by many Conservative MPs as a threat to British sovereignty.  Despite the fact that the new Prime Minister and Conservative Party leader John Major succeeded in securing a British opt-out on the single currency and social chapter issues, as well as ensuring that the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs Pillars would remain intergovernmental, he was faced with a rebellion by eighty-four backbench MPs over ratification of the treaty.​[42]​  Despite this seeming vote of no confidence by his own party, Major’s ability to achieve the opt-out on monetary union did serve to reunite a party standing over the integration fault line.​[43]​  Although Major was able to keep the Eurosceptic and pro-European wings of his party together until the 1997 General Election, a humiliating defeat at the hands of Tony Blair and New Labour proved that intra-party rifts over the question of European integration can only be viewed as harmful in the long run.  This is a lesson that the Conservatives in 2005 still have not learned.         
For many Eurosceptics in Britain, including Margaret Thatcher, Jacques Delors stands out as the father of European federalism.​[44]​  Appropriately, the Labour MP Gisela Stuart, who acted as one of the UK Parliamentary representatives for the Convention on the Future of Europe, stated that “Jacques Delors is, unquestionably, one of the most successful Commission presidents,” because of the substantial integrationist accomplishments that occurred under his watch.​[45]​  According to Alan Walters, the Brussels Leviathan was used by Delors to create a United States of Europe that could compete with the United States of America for supremacy on the global stage.​[46]​  Charles A. Kupchan believes that the recent unilateralist behavior of the United States of America in its “War on Terror” is proof that the leaders of this country, the only superpower in the world today, are ignoring the changing political landscape.  For Kupchan the increasing power of the European Union, as envisoned by Delors, will allow it to challenge the United States for hegemony in the near future.​[47]​  Whether or not this is true is beside the point.  Delors’ dream of deeper and wider integration is occurring at a rapid rate.  British Eurosceptics who want to cut and run may affect more than just their place in Europe.  Withdrawing from the European Union or taking on a lesser role in Brussels may have consequences for the growing transatlantic divide between Europe and the United States.  Timothy Garton Ash is adamant that Britain needs to be a full member of the European Union so that it can push the Euroatlantic agenda that will bridge the gap between Europe and the United States.​[48]​  Without Britain’s essential role in Europe, who else can sustain the weakened transatlantic alliance?  The potential consequences for Ash are too great for Britain and its citizens to ignore.  As a result, despite the antipathy of British Eurosceptics towards Delors and European integration they must look beyond their borders, as they were so used to doing during the era of Empire, and understand that the United Kingdom belongs in the EU.
Eurosceptics in Britain today argue that the financial costs of leaving the EU are much less than remaining an active member.  This is a drastic reversal on the reason why Britain’s political elites were so eager to gain membership in the 1960s and 1970s:  free trade.  The Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan initially proposed British membership in the EEC as a move to make the country more financially sound.  Membership made sense in economic terms and in light of the declining position of the British economy open trade with Europe was a natural choice.​[49]​  According to Andrew Moravcsik, the decision for Britain to join the European integration project was a rational one driven by economic considerations.​[50]​  But economics and conditions have changed.  In 2004, the Director of the think-tank “Global Britain” unveiled the book A Cost too Far? An analysis of the net economic costs and benefits for the UK of EU membership.  The book posits that only ten percent of the UK’s economy is the result of trade with the EU and this would not be substantially altered if Britain decided to forfeit its membership because a free trade agreement could be established.  Moreover, Milne argues that leaving the EU would add between £15 billion and £40 billion per year due to the fact that Britain pays more for EU membership than it ever receives in return.  After all, with the importance of the structural funds for buttressing weak economies among EU members (Spain immediately comes to mind) a strong economy is fiscally punished for its success.​[51]​  However, what Milne forgets to include in his argument is that the EU would provide financial assistance to the United Kingdom if it ever fell on hard times.  What organization would financially bail out an independent UK to the same degree?  For many in Britain, including incoming EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson, the hard Euroscepticism of removing the United Kingdom from a financially flailing Europe should not occur because of New Labour’s economic success.  Instead, argues Mandelson, Britain should use its influence and expertise to reform the EU and put it back on track as a dynamic world economy.​[52]​  Britain in Europe, despite the latter’s drawbacks, is the only viable choice for most political elites in the country today.      
Before proceeding further into the British case study it is necessary to understand the concept of Euroscepticism as defined by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak.  As stated above, Euroscepticism is a British invention.  However, what exactly is Euroscepticism and how can it be measured on an intra-party or individual level?  Euroscepticism, if the word is broken down, means having doubt about Europe.  For the purposes of this argument Europe stands for the European Union.  Taggart and Szczerbiak, though, do not stop at such a pedestrian definition.  They create a simple taxonomy for Euroscepticism, which includes a hard and soft version.  Hard Euroscepticism is defined as the “outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration.”​[53]​  For countries that are already members of the European Union, hard Eurosceptic citizens argue that their state should immediately extricate itself from membership.  Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is more complex.  They break soft Euroscepticism into two components:  policy and national interest.  Policy Euroscepticism is opposition to legislation meant to substantially deepen European integration in the political (EU Constitution) and economic (EMU) spheres.  National-interest Euroscepticism “involves employing the rhetoric of defending or standing up for the ‘national interest’ in the context of debates about the EU.”​[54]​  It must be stressed that neither of these forms of soft Euroscepticism are in favor of withdrawal from the EU.  However, once a person or a party pushes for complete separation from the European project they can, under the typology outlined above, only be considered hard Eurosceptics.
A final distinction must be made regarding party affiliation to hard or soft Euroscepticism.  Taggart and Szczerbiak point to a dichotomy between core and periphery parties and the levels of Euroscepticism they adopt.  According to their findings, core parties never adopt hard Euroscepticism as the official party line.  After all, they are either in power or have the potential to gain power at any election.​[55]​  Parties on the periphery are largely excluded from decision-making processes and this fact, in turn, makes them appeal to the latent fears running through all societies about the loss of sovereignty to Brussels.  Parties on the political periphery based in England, such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Veritas, and the BNP, all push for a hard version of Euroscepticism in order to attract disillusioned voters.  Nationalist parties from the Celtic periphery nations of Scotland and Wales, on the other hand, do not adhere to Euroscepticism of any kind.  They are the exception to the core/periphery rule.  The Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales make the case for being independent states within the European Union.  This is because they view such a set up as preferable to control by Westminster.​[56]​  A final example outside of the United Kingdom that proves the supposition that core parties do not adhere to hard Euroscepticism deals with periphery parties that move into the mainstream.  The Austrian Freedom Party under Jörg Haider became known throughout the world when they won twenty-seven percent of the votes in the October 1999 legislative elections and formed a coalition government with the Austrian People’s Party.​[57]​  As soon as the transformation from periphery to core was complete, the party immediately abandoned its hard Eurosceptic stance and accepted Austria’s place within the European Union.​[58]​  While hard Euroscepticism is a way of life for the periphery parties of England, success has shown that such a stance can prove quite superficial.  
The typology of Taggart and Szczerbiak, however, seems lacking.  I submit that a third type of Euroscepticism should be included to understand the extent of the phenomenon in Great Britain.  Xenophobic Euroscepticism is an extreme form of the phenomenon that has recently been attracting a great deal of media coverage.  Xenophobic Euroscepticism is defined as hostility towards the European Union because its institutions are viewed as the reason behind mass, unwanted immigration into the country.  Xenophobic Eurosceptics demand that their country immediately withdraw from EU membership.  While the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is more of a standard hard Eurosceptic party with anti-immigrant leanings, the newly formed Veritas Party headed by Robert Kilroy-Silk is the epitome of xenophobic Euroscepticism.  Robert Kilroy-Silk, the former television presenter, recently resigned from the United Kingdom Independence Party after he faced expulsion for trying to commandeer the party leadership from the former Conservative MP Roger Knapman.​[59]​  During the launch of Veritas, Kilroy-Silk was vehement in his assertion that Britain was being stolen from its citizens by mass immigration.​[60]​  The policy adopted claims that Veritas “would only admit foreigners who were required because they had specific skills to offer.”​[61]​  All other immigrants, except for those claiming asylum, would be deported immediately according to his plans.  Given Mr. Kilroy-Silk’s past, it is easy to see his fledgling party as, at the very least, xenophobic.  In 2003 he was fired from his BBC show “Kilroy” for his column in the Sunday Express describing Arabs as “suicide bombers, limb-amputators, and women repressors.”​[62]​  The xenophobic Euroscepticism embraced by Mr. Kilroy-Silk may endear him to the overtly racist supporters of the British National Party​[63]​ but this blatant fear of foreigners will fail to make Veritas any more than another protest party with a flashy leader.  
A final point needs to be made about xenophobic Euroscepticism.  Unlike the dichotomous relationship of hard and soft Euroscepticism, the xenophobic variety can overlap with either of the other two.  A person can be a soft and xenophobic Eurosceptic at the same time.  Moreover, the example of the newly-formed Veritas Party shows that an entire fringe party can promote withdrawal from the European Union (hard) based on a fear of increased immigration as a direct result of EU membership (xenophobic).  Therefore, I posit that xenophobic Euroscepticism bridges the divide between hard and soft Euroscepticism and creates a Eurosceptic continuum.  Thus, the xenophobic variety of Euroscepticism may prove to be the uniting force in a movement that has been defined by polar fragmentation in the past.
Now that the three forms of Euroscepticism prevalent in the United Kingdom have been outlined it is important to turn to the topic of immigration.  Immigration has been a source of contention within British politics ever since the end of World War II when a labor shortage prompted the Government to open the country’s borders to immigrants.​[64]​  Through the years, as a result of increasing violence towards non-white immigrants, Great Britain began to pass numerous Race Relations Acts.  These acts were designed to legally protect immigrants from acts of racism.  While the heated rhetoric of elite racists like Enoch Powell, with his “Rivers of Blood” speech, predicted a race war due to the fact that non-white immigrants would not integrate into British society, the Government did everything in its power to ensure the survival of law and order.​[65]​  As a direct result of the tensions of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s the Race Relations legislation on the books in Britain is some of the most comprehensive anywhere in Europe.  This fact has led to a paradox for European integration.  The British believe, with justification, that they have the finest anti-discrimination laws in Europe.  Both soft and hard Eurosceptics, therefore, have argued against further integration because British Race Relations legislation will be undermined by inferior EU directives.​[66]​  Immigration is still a hotly contested subject in Great Britain, with the Conservative Party poised to use it in the upcoming General Election to undermine the Labour Government’s lead in all major polls.​[67]​  This tactic seems to be working as evidenced by a recent I.C.M. poll, which shows Labour’s lead over the Conservatives cut to a mere three percentage points (thirty-seven versus thirty-four percent).​[68]​  However, it must be understood that the Conservatives are not calling for an end to immigration and the deportation of current immigrant residents, as Mr. Kilroy-Silk prefers.  They are clearly playing to their strengths as a law and order party interested in eliminating abuses of the system.  However, the behavior of the Conservatives, although not blatantly xenophobic, does serve this purpose for members of the masses with an inclination towards anti-immigrant sentiment.  A parallel was witnessed in the 1994 Congressional elections in the United States where the Republican Party used, among other things, the problems of illegal Mexican and Caribbean immigrants to mobilize voters in their favor.​[69]​  Framing was their mechanism for gaining electoral power.  Although the Conservative Party is, in a roundabout way, pressing for greater immigration controls, it appears that if voters want pure xenophobic Euroscepticism from their political elites they will need to turn to fringe parties such as Veritas and the British National Party (BNP).
Perhaps surprisingly, the party that is most likely to lose votes as a result of Veritas playing upon xenophobic Euroscepticism is the Labour Party.  The Labour Party has always relied on the working class for the base of its support.  This base, under New Labour, does appear to be growing increasingly disillusioned with the moderate ideological stance of its party of choice.  The British Social Attitudes Survey of 2000/2001 showed that the working class feels the most vulnerable economically towards immigrants.  In the survey, out of 808 random respondents identifying themselves as members of the working class fifty-seven percent stated that they felt “immigrants take jobs away from people born in Britain.”​[70]​  This immigration-fueled workplace competition, whether accurate or not, is a commonly-held perception that xenophobic Eurosceptics will use in their bid to wrestle votes away from the pro-Europe Labour Party.  After all, as Kilroy-Silk is likely to argue, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU will serve to protect the working class from the free movement of labor promised by deeper integration with Brussels.  It is up to the Labour Party to gain control of its core electorate.   
Media-based Euroscepticism is a powerful force in Britain today.  It is used, first and foremost, as a way for newspapers to increase their financial gains.  The currently high levels of media-framed Euroscepticism in Britain began with the Labour-leaning tabloid The Sun in 1990, when it attacked the President of the Commission Jacques Delors over his vision to create a federal Europe.​[71]​  From this point on, especially with the emergence of such explosive issues as the Maastricht Treaty, including the single currency, qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Union (formerly known as the Council of Ministers), and the European Constitution, the number of both hard and soft Eurosceptic newspapers outweighed pro-European tabloids and broadsheets, the latter being the name for the mainstream print media, by a two to one margin.​[72]​  In fact, with the overdramatization of EU issues many newspapers are simply imposing Euromyths on the population.  Timothy Bainbridge argues that Euromyths are aimed at the unelected bureaucrats who run Brussels, mainly the European Commission, who are seen as imposing their will from a position above the law.  Most of these Euromyths have absolutely no basis in fact, but they create good reading and sell newspapers.​[73]​  A sampling of various headlines relating to Europe, in addition to the prevalence of Euromyths, shows the hostility felt by the print media towards the EU.  One of the most infamous comes from that stalwart of print Euroscepticism The Sun.  In an article about bananas the newspaper erroneously reported that the Commission had banned bananas that were considered “too bendy” and imposed a minimum size on the popular fruit.​[74]​  Many times, the Eurosceptic press pushes the loss of British sovereignty as the reason behind its anti-EU stance.  Headlines such as “No Surrender!; Battles for Britain” (The Sun, 12 December 2003), “Our history in the bin; Biggest threat to Britain” (The Sun, 21 May 2003), “Devastating effects of giving away our birthrights” (Daily Mail, 29 October 2004), and “Blair signs away Britain’s sovereignty” (Daily Mail, 29 October 2004) all use British sovereignty as a legitimate reason for attacking the EU.  Other articles from the broadsheet The Times push that the EU is bad for the economy (“Focus:  UK PLC is top dog – who needs Europe?,” 20 June 2004) or the controversial portrayal of Gestapo-like tactics used by Europe to encourage support for the EU Constitution (“They don’t like the EU Constitution?  Quick, send in the force,” 21 January 2005).  While these anti-EU headlines and stories are good examples, they only scratch the surface of the impact of Euroscepticism in Britain.   
In addition to Eurosceptic articles that advocate a rejection of the EU integration project, the prevalence of xenophobic Euroscepticism in the print media has fostered a moral backlash among the British population against immigrants and asylum seekers who are viewed as invaders of the United Kingdom.​[75]​  Consequently, articles appear that blame the arrival of new diseases in the country on immigrants.  According to the Daily Mail, a new deadly superstrain of tuberculosis has entered the country with immigrants from the new EU member states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.​[76]​  The dangers of this media-induced xenophobic Euroscepticism are not only harmful to the prospects of European integration, but also can serve to create racist attacks on innocent immigrants.  One of the main objectives of the parliamentary questionnaires discussed in the next section was to get a handle on whether political elites believe that, based on their stance relating to the EU, the media frame issues in an attempt to foster Euroscepticism.  The quantitative data corroborates the existence of media-induced Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom.
The Evidence
	The 2004 European Parliament elections took place in the United Kingdom on June 10, 2004.  This election witnessed the stunning showing of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).  The UKIP, thought of as simply a fringe party of the right before June, had never held more than three seats in the European Parliament at any time.  On June 10 they won a staggering twelve seats (seventy-eight Members of the European Parliament (MEP) come from the United Kingdom) with seventeen percent of the vote.​[77]​  Although most academics believe that Euroscepticism is a second-tier issue for vote-getting because it is fragmented by the polar opposite versions of hard and soft Euroscepticism​[78]​ and political elites feel that the EU has always been a secondary matter at General Elections due to the failures of both the Conservatives and Labour to profit electorally from anti-Europe sentiment they have fomented,​[79]​ the success of the UKIP has ratcheted up the importance of the issue nationally.  The UKIP is a populist party that pushes for the United Kingdom’s immediate withdrawal from the European Union.  There is nothing soft about this Eurosceptic position.  But the main reasons behind their position of withdrawal from the EU relate to the “centralised and undemocratic nature of the institutions, the corruption inherent in them and the recognition that the loss of a benign national identity…is partially Europe’s fault.”​[80]​  Additionally, UKIP has used the argument that the British population is overflowing and the infrastructure of the state cannot handle an influx of new immigrants.  Therefore, while UKIP does not adhere to the overt racism of the BNP​[81]​ (described oddly as swivel-eyed xenophobia by Simon Heffer), despite the headline of a recent article in The Observer,​[82]​ it is engaged in xenophobic Euroscepticism, as defined above, as a complement to its hard Eurosceptic platform.
	But where did UKIP come from?  The United Kingdom Independence Party was founded on September 3, 1993 at the London School of Economics by members of the Anti-Federalist League (AFL).  From the beginning the party has defined as its foremost goal the reestablishment of UK independence by withdrawal from the EU.  Following its humble beginnings, UKIP made a huge splash in the 2004 European Parliament election due to the combination of its anti-EU message, given credence by the current debate over the adoption of the EU Constitution, and the use of charismatic political elites.  UKIP party leader Roger Knapman used a chance encounter with Dick Morris, the former polling guru for President Bill Clinton, to learn the tactics of creating and sustaining political momentum.​[83]​  One of the ideas put forward was to get celebrities involved in the cause.  In addition to receiving endorsements from television stars like Joan Collins, UKIP landed its biggest catch when former Labour MP and chat show host Robert Kilroy-Silk decided to run for the position of MEP.  With the entrance of Robert Kilroy-Silk as a major player on the UKIP political scene in the spring of 2004 the party had its charismatic shining star and a subsequent strong showing in the 2004 European Parliament elections.​[84]​  UKIP trying to draw on the charisma of a major public figure to increase its electoral viability is not a novel idea.  The Republikaner party in Germany went so far as to elect the publicly recognizable Franz Schoenhuber as chairman in order to gain legitimacy for the party.  This move, however, did not prove popular with party activists and he was soon replaced by a rather drab politician in Rolf Schlierer who could not increase the party gains achieved under the charismatic Schoenhuber.​[85]​  It will be interesting to see what happens to UKIP momentum in the upcoming General Election following the departure of Kilroy-Silk to form his own party of Veritas.  Will UKIP lose its momentum and fall flat?  Will the Conservatives take control of the Eurosceptic voters mobilized by UKIP?  Or will Kilroy-Silk use his charisma to turn Veritas into the next UKIP?​[86]​  No matter what happens, Euroscepticism, whether hard, soft or xenophobic, is gaining electoral ground in the United Kingdom.
	The publication of the 2000/2001 edition of the British Social Attitudes Survey brought with it some interesting revelations.  The English seem to be finding a distinctive national identity in the wake of devolution being granted to Scotland and Wales.​[87]​  Using the Moreno national identity scale, between 1997 and 1999 the percentage of people living in England who identified themselves as “English, not British” more than doubled from seven to seventeen percent.​[88]​  It is interesting to note that England is the only nation within the United Kingdom that elected UKIP members to seats in the European Parliament.  Moreover, UKIP received a percentage of votes in the European Parliamentary elections of 2004 that directly corresponds to the percentage of people living in England who identify themselves as solely English (seventeen percent in both instances).  The impact of identity in England on the electoral success of hard Eurosceptic parties is a topic that deserves further research.  Perhaps a follow-up to the mass-based random surveys that yielded the results in the British Social Attitudes compilation would provide the impetus for such an undertaking.  Unfortunately, this paper is neither the time nor the place for such an analysis.
	This brings me to the political elite questionnaires that I sent out to 512 Members of the United Kingdom House of Commons between January 31 and February 9, 2005.​[89]​  Six multiple-choice questions were asked with two of the questions having a following up question.  Forty-eight MPs responded to the questionnaire for an overall response rate of 9.38%.  Of these, twenty-five answered the questionnaire, twenty-two abstained with one MP (Gisela Stuart, Labour) holding over for a telephone interview that was conducted on March 8, 2005.​[90]​  Of the positive respondents, twenty-one are male (84.00%) and four are female (16.00%).  Twelve of the respondents are from the governing Labour Party, seven are from the Conservative Party and six are Liberal Democrats.  The chart below summarizes the sample size for the different questions:


Sample Size & Response Percentage			
					










The first question posed to the MPs asked “what is the most important issue of the upcoming General Election?”  This question was used to gauge the importance of the European Union and immigration and asylum to the MPs.  The answers, especially given the strong emphasis placed in recent weeks on immigration by the Labour and Conservative Parties, are a bit of a surprise.  Purely domestic issues won out on this question with 47.62% of the respondents believing that the National Health Service (NHS) will be the most important issue.  “Taxes” was second at 33.33% and pensions came in third at 28.57%.  Immigration and asylum and the European Union both proved less significant with 4.76% each.​[91]​  Given the small sample size only one MP voted for each of these issues.  The MP who stated that the European Union is the most important issue in the upcoming General Election is the Conservative MP Andrew Rosindell.  Mr. Rosindell is a dedicated hard Eurosceptic who promotes the United Kingdom’s immediate withdrawal from the European Union.  As for immigration and asylum, it was listed among three other choices by the Labour MP Bill Tynan as being important, so little can be drawn from this observation.  On a final note, the Conservative MP David Heathcoat-Amory wrote in his answer that the EU would not receive the attention it deserves.  A known Eurosceptic, Mr. Heathcoat-Amory added that Britain needs “a different relationship with the EU, whatever it is called.”​[92]​  Overall the lack of importance given by Members of Parliament to the subject of the European Union or the related topic of immigration and asylum remains true to the belief that Europe is a second-tier issue.​[93]​  But one of the main points of this paper has been to show that with the electoral success of UKIP at the 2004 European Parliament elections it appears that the issue of European integration may be gaining momentum.  If the hard Eurosceptic parties achieve success in May this is a statistic that is bound to change.
     
	The second question of the survey asked these political elites “what is fueling Euroscepticism in Britain?”  The answer that carried the day was xenophobia with 66.67%.  The only other substantial answer was that EU integration, or the deepening of the institutional powers of Europe, was responsible for Eurosceptic sentiment.  If this answer is representative of constituents’ beliefs, then perhaps the xenophobic Euroscepticism espoused by the Veritas Party of Robert Kilroy-Silk will gain headway in the upcoming elections.  If Veritas does establish a presence in the House of Commons, what will that mean for xenophobic Euroscepticism in the future?  Stay tuned.  On a final note of interest, the strength of the British economy was only chosen by one MP as a reason for the existence of Euroscepticism.  It would be interesting to see what an economic Eurosceptic such as Ian Milne would make of this.  Does the economy have anything to do with a desire to alter or change the EU?  Hopefully the picture will clear up with further investigation.
  	The third survey question asked MPs how they view the European Union.  The answers, on the whole, are close to the initial premises.  A majority (56.00%) viewed the EU positively, while 32.00% answered that they “take the good with the bad.”  Only a small minority of 12.00% stated that they view the EU with contempt, with one MP (4.00%) having a neutral perception.  Given the strong support of the political elite for the European Union where then is Euroscepticism coming from?

   	The follow-up question asked, “if you view the European Union negatively, do you think Britain should leave?”  Due to the fact that only three respondents viewed the EU negatively, there is no statistically justifiable reason for unveiling my results.  Instead, I turn to the Economic and Social Research Council’s surveys of British parliamentarians that were conducted in 1998.  The age of this survey made me wary to rely on its findings and was a major catalyst of my e-mail campaign.  The ESRC survey did ask MPs whether “Britain should withdraw from the EU.”  Their data shows that 26% of Conservatives, 3% of Liberal Democrats and 3% of Labour subscribe to hard Euroscepticism.​[94]​  Unfortunately, the results must be interpreted with extreme caution given that they were compiled seven years ago, there has been a General Election in the intervening period, and UKIP was not the force then that it proved to be in June of 2004.
	Given the possibility that Great Britain may leave the European Union at some point in the future, the question was posed if the UK should completely separate or withdraw with certain conditions.  Unsurprisingly, not a single MP went for complete separation.  73.33% agreed that if Britain leaves the EU it should only do so with a free trade agreement intact.  Political elites obviously believe that free trade with other European Union member states is a critical component of the British economy.  Another 13.33% stated that Britain should leave the EU with a free trade agreement intact and an option to return without accession negotiations.  Overall, free trade was a necessary component of withdrawal for 86.66% of the respondents.
        
	The results of the next question are proof positive that the media is viewed as increasing Euroscepticism in the UK.  Although a number of sources on media-influenced Euroscepticism can be found, there has never been a survey conducted as to the opinions of political elites on this question.  Even the thorough ESRC-funded survey is conspicuously missing a question regarding the attitudes of parliamentary elites towards media-framed Euroscepticism.  A staggering 91.67% of respondents answered that the media increases Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom.  Only two MPs chose to answer that media coverage has no impact on Euroscepticism.  These MPs were the hard Eurosceptic Liberal Democrat Gwyneth Dunwoody and the Conservative Shadow Cabinet Minister the Right Honourable David Heathcoat-Amory.  Mr. Heathcoat-Amory had another interesting answer, which would add credence to the alternative hypothesis expounded above that the masses are creating Euroscepticism, not elites or the media.  Heathcoat-Amory commented that “there has been an increase in eurosceptical coverage in recent years but this has followed not led public attitudes.”​[95]​  This seems to be a rather dubious claim given the unsophisticated nature of the masses when it comes to European Union issues.  In fact, Eurobarometer recently remarked that the UK has earned “the nickname of the ‘don’t know, don’t care’ capital of Europe.”​[96]​  While the belief in mass-based Euroscepticism does legitimate the calls of political elites for either altering the existing terms of Britain’s EU membership or pushing for withdrawal, it does not seem probable given the lack of information and interest possessed by the general public in the United Kingdom.   Thus, it appears quite evident that the media does frame issues in such a way as to create Euroscepticism in the UK and is not simply responding to the desires of the electorate.  The reason why the stories are readily consumed by the masses has to do with the scandalous usage of Euromyths by creative tabloid editors.
  
	The final query of the questionnaire is also critical to the hypothesis being tested here.  Political elites were asked to judge their parliamentary peers as a whole when they were surveyed as to whether politicians frame issues in order to create Euroscepticism.  In line with the hypothesis that political elites frame issues in such a way as to escalate Euroscepticism, 86.96% of respondents believed this to be true.  Only three of the twenty-three respondents on this question actually felt that political elites do not fuel Euroscepticism with the way they frame issues.  The second part of this question then asked for the respondents to identify the parties responsible for increasing Eurosceptic sentiment among the masses.​[97]​  Once again, in line with the arguments put forward above the Conservatives (75.00%) and UKIP (60.00%) were seen as having the greatest impact on the existence of mass Euroscepticism.​[98]​
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MPs providing answers to the Questionnaire
The Honourable David Atkinson MP – Conservative
The Honourable Norman Baker MP – Liberal Democrat
The Honourable Timothy Boswell MP – Conservative
The Honourable Peter Bottomley MP – Conservative
The Honourable David Chaytor MP – Labour
The Honourable David Chidgey MP – Liberal Democrat
The Honourable Helen Clark MP – Labour
The Honourable Tony Colman MP – Labour
The Honourable Claire Curtis-Thomas MP – Labour
 The Honourable Gwyneth Dunwoody MP – Liberal Democrat
The Honourable Paul Flynn MP – Labour
The Honourable Andrew George MP – Liberal Democrat
The Honourable Nick Harvey MP – Liberal Democrat
The Right Honourable David Heathcoat-Amory MP – Conservative
The Honourable David Kidney MP – Labour
The Right Honourable Michael Mates MP – Conservative
The Honourable Tony McWalter MP – Labour
The Right Honourable Alun Michael MP – Labour
The Honourable Chris Mole MP – Labour
The Honourable Syd Rapson MP – Labour
The Honourable Andrew Rosindell MP – Conservative
The Honourable Ian Taylor MP - Conservative
The Honourable Bill Tynan MP – Labour
The Honourable Roger Williams MP – Liberal Democrat












My name is Bryan Glass and I am a Ph.D. student at the University of Texas at Austin.  Previously I earned my M.Phil. in European Studies at the University of Cambridge studying English regional and national identity in the wake of devolution.  Attached in Word format is a questionnaire regarding my latest project on Euroscepticism.  I would really appreciate your feedback as a Member of Parliament.  

If you choose to take the survey the answers you provide will be used in the composition of a scholarly paper entitled:  “The 2004 European Parliament Elections in England:  The Impact of Identity Politics and Elite Framing.”  The paper will be presented at the European Union Studies Association Biennial Conference on March 31, 2005 in Austin, Texas.  If you would like a copy of the paper upon completion please send that request in the text of the e-mail with your answers.  I will e-mail copies of the paper as an attachment to anyone interested beginning in April.  Upon request, a hard copy will be posted to you.

Instructions for Submitting Answers to Euroscepticism Questionnaire:

Please record your answers, along with your name, in the text of an e-mail to bsg22@mail.utexas.edu.  If you would rather remain anonymous please indicate which party you are a member of, your age, and gender for comparative purposes.  An example would be:

Subject:  Euroscepticism Questionnaire

Name:  John/Joanna Bull 
Or 














Bryan S. Glass, M.Phil. (Cantab)
Ph.D. Candidate, University of Texas at Austin
E-mail:  bsg22@mail.utexas.edu (​mailto:bsg22@mail.utexas.edu​) or bsg22cam@hotmail.com (​mailto:bsg22cam@hotmail.com​)
      Telephone:  001-512-371-7476
Questionnaire on Euroscepticism








2.	In your opinion, what is fueling Euroscepticism in Britain?
A.	Xenophobia
B.	Strong British Economy
C.	Deepening of the European Union
D.	Enlargement of the European Union
E.	Combination of C & D

3.	How do you view the European Union?
A.	With Contempt
B.	Positively
C.	I take the good with the bad
D.	Neutral




4.	If Britain should choose to leave the European Union, under what conditions?
A.	Complete Separation
B.	With a free trade agreement intact
C.	With an option to return without accession negotiations
D.	Combination of A & C
E.	Combination of B & C

5.	What, in your opinion, is the impact that the media has on Euroscepticism?
A.	Media coverage increases Euroscepticism
B.	Media coverage decreases Euroscepticism
C.	There is no noticeable impact

6.	Do you feel that politicians frame issues in such a way as to create Euroscepticism among the public?
A.	Yes
B.	No
If you answered “Yes,” which party, in your estimation, is responsible for fostering increased Euroscepticism in Britain today?
      A.  Liberal Democrats
      B.  Conservatives
      C.  Labour
      D.  United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
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